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The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers focus on the technical 
possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g. in education or health). In this short experimental 
paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: Robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial 
purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment with 399 participants 
which explores the following three questions: (i) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe intentions to deceive to artificial agents? 
(ii) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (iii) Do 
they blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a 
resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more 
attention than it presently attracts.      
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Innovation in artificial intelligence and machine learning has spurred increasing human-robot interaction in 
diverse domains, ranging from search and rescue via manufacturing to navigation [1-4]. For teamwork of this 
sort to succeed when complex tasks are at stake, humans and robots frequently need the capacity of theory of 
mind (or second-order “mental” models) to represent each other’s epistemic states (knowledge, belief) and pro-
attitudes (desires, goals). Theory of mind comes “live” in the human brain at age three to five [5], and its role in 
cooperative human-robot interaction has received considerable attention recently [6-11], for a review see [12]. 
Once an artificial agent comes equipped with a theory of mind, it is prima facie capable of deception. 
Differently put, an agent of this sort is can purposefully bring another agent to adopt a representation which it 
(the deceiving agent) deems false. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that robot deception has recently 
become a hot topic [13-15], for a review, see [16]. A considerable chunk of this literature focuses on beneficial 
deception [17], for instance in contexts of search and rescue, healthcare, and education, where “white lies” can, 
under certain conditions, have positive consequences (e.g. by inciting more effort in learning or rehabilitation 
activities see [19,20]). These are interesting case studies. As scholars with a bent for ethics have begun to 
highlight [22-25], however, we should not lose sight of paradigm cases of deception, which constitute a pro 
tanto wrong, or underestimate the vast possibilities of harmful robot deception across domains as diverse as 
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marketing, politics, privacy and military applications. This is precisely what the present paper does. We’ll focus 
on (i) verbal rather than nonverbal deception [26], of the (ii) non-beneficial rather than the beneficial kind, 
concentrating on (iii) the human rather than the robot perspective so as to explore the (iv) downstream normative 
consequences that matter most. Differently put, we’ll explore whether humans, when interacting with artificial 
agents, are prone to attribute lies as readily and according to the same criteria to artificial agents as when they 
are interacting with other human agents.  
The paper proceeds as follows: The concept of human lying is briefly examined in section 2.1, followed by a 
brief discussion as to whether the required capacities for lying carry over to artificial agents, and how the 
normative implications of lying across agent types might differ (section 2.2). Section 3 presents a preregistered 
empirical experiment which explores (i) the propensity to judge different agent types (human v. robot) as lying 
(section 3.3.1), (ii) the willingness to ascribe an intention to deceive and actual deception across agent types 
(section 3.3.2) and (iii) blame attributions for lying across agent types (section 3.3.3). The implications of the 
findings are discussed in section 3.4, section 4 concludes.   
2 THE CONCEPT OF LYING 
2.1 Standard Accounts and Empirical Data 
 
There is a large philosophical literature on the concept of lying ([27-32], for a review, see [33]), and the folk 
concept of lying has received considerable attention by empirically minded philosophers and linguists (for a 
review, see [34]). The following three criteria are frequently considered central to the prototype concept of lying 
[35]:  
 
 P1: The proposition uttered by the speakers is false. [Falsity]  
 P2: The speaker believes the proposition she utters to be false. [Untruthfulness] 
P3: In uttering the proposition, the speaker intends to deceive the addressee. [Intention to deceive]    
 
Coleman & Kay ran an experiment with a full-factorial design (i.e. eight conditions, where each factor is either 
satisfied or not), which showed that the proposed prototype concept is on the right track. Falsity proved the 
weakest and untruthfulness the strongest predictor of a lie. Both philosophically, and empirically, falsity is indeed 
the most contested property. On the objective view, the speaker, in order to lie, must correctly believe the 
proposition uttered to be false [32,33]. This would mean that a speaker cannot lie by uttering a true proposition 
which she believes to be false. On the subjective view, however, the speaker merely takes the proposition 
uttered to be false: Whether or not it actually is false does not matter, so that one can lie by uttering a true claim. 
Whereas there is some empirical support for the objective view [36], the overwhelming majority of findings 
suggests robust support for the subjective view for English-speaking adults [35, 37-39]. In Coleman and Kay’s 
original study, for instance, 70% of the participants judged an agent who uttered a claim she believed false with 
the intention to deceive to be lying, despite the fact that the claim was actually true.  
 The third property, according to which lying requires an intention to deceive the addressee is also 
contentious. Imagine a case where Sally, who is married, has an affair with Sue, the secretary. This is common 
knowledge at the office, and Sally knows it is. Towards the end of the Christmas party, Sally leaves with Sue 
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and says “I’m going home and will drop Sue at her place on the way.” As critics of P3 argue, bald-face lies of 
this sort are indeed lies. However, since it is common knowledge that Sally will likely spend the night with Sue, 
it is hard to maintain that she has an intention to deceive because nobody can be deceived in this regard [28,29, 
31,40]. The standard response consists in denying that bald-face lies are lies in the first place [41-43]. 
Alternatively, one could also argue that they involve an intention to deceive (for an overview, see [44]). Empirical 
findings support the latter view [45,46]: Most people categorize bald-face lies as lies, though they also ascribe 
an intention to deceive to the speaker.  
 So much for the folk concept of lying when verbal human deception is at stake. In the next section, we 
will survey a few prima facie concerns as to whether this concept carries over neatly to lying artificial agents.   
 
2.2 Lying artificial agents 
Among the three general prototype criteria of a lie, falsity (P1) proves the least controversial when it comes to 
robots: Clearly artificial agents can utter propositions, and clearly these can be false. The untruthfulness and 
the intention to deceive, by contrast, are more contentious, as they entail considerable cognitive and conative 
capacities on behalf of the agent. As such, they dovetail interestingly with recent attempts to build an artificial 
theory of mind (cf. [47-49]) – regarding which certain authors also caution care [50].  
Let’s start with untruthfulness: While it might irk some to ascribe belief to artificial agents, it’s relatively 
unproblematic to say that artificial agents can entertain informational states and thus, in some limited sense, be 
aware of representations (what philosophers call “propositions”). Once this is granted, nothing obstructs positing 
a capacity for second-order propositions, such as taking a certain proposition p to be true or false, likely or 
unlikely, believed or rejected. Hence, there seems to be no major obstacle for the capacity of untruthfulness, 
even though one might want to shy away from the usage of rich psychological terms (“believes”, “thinks”) in its 
description. 
How about the intention to deceive? What, precisely, intentions are, is controversial both philosophically (for 
a review, see [51]), and psychologically (see e.g. the debate surrounding the Knobe effect, [52,53]). However, 
most scholars agree that doing X intentionally entails (i) a pro-attitude such as a desire to bring about X as well 
as (ii) some epistemic state that one is bringing about X – be it knowledge (as suggested by Anscombe, see 
[54]) or mere belief (as argued by Davidson, see [55]).  While care regarding the use of rich psychological states 
(“intends”, “wants”, “desires”, “knows”, “believes” etc., see [50].) is once again in order, we have already 
established the prima facie plausibility of (ii), i.e. epistemic states of sorts, for artificial agents. It is presumably 
also uncontroversial to say that such agents can have goal states, objectives or quasi-desires broadly conceived. 
The central question, then, is whether quasi-beliefs, quasi-desires, and quasi-intentions suffice to fulfil the 
capacities we expect an agent – human or not – to be capable of lying. 
So far it has been established that, at least prima facie, artificial agents might have the required capacities 
for lying, or at least some proto-capacities that could suffice. Whether this is indeed the case is of course still 
up for empirical confirmation, and our experimental design will take it into account. A final point regards the 
normative consequences of lying. Whereas it is well-established that humans consider lying as a pro tanto 
wrong, and – odd cases aside – blame other people for lying, it is not clear that our moral assessment carries 
over neatly to artificial agents. One worry is that we might simply consider artificial agents as the wrong sort of 
agent for attributions of blame or moral responsibility (cf. Sparrow’s “responsibility gaps”, [58, 59]) – inter alia 
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because they lack autonomy in any substantial sense of the term. Hence, even if people are willing to judge 
that robots can lie, they might balk at the suggestion that a robot can be blamed. There are some findings by 
Malle and colleagues which suggest that this is not the case. These authors, however, raise another problem: 
There might be things which are morally inacceptable (and/or blameworthy) when done by a human agent, yet 
morally acceptable (and blameless) when done by an artificial agent. Differently put, the normative landscape, 
and moral evaluation, might be sensitive to agent type. This is, in fact, exactly what previous studies found 
[56,57], and we will explore whether this kind of agent-dependent two-tiered morality also applies in the domain 
of deceptive linguistic communication.   
3 EXPERIMENT 
3.1 Participants 
A total of 399 participants were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete a Qualtrics online study for 
a small compensation. The experiment was rigorously preregistered. 2 The IP address of all participants was 
restricted to the US. Following the preregistered criteria participants were excluded if they failed an attention 
check, a comprehension question, responded in under 10 seconds to the main task or were not native English 
speakers. The final sample comprised of 333 participants (42.9% female; age M=42 years, SD=13 years).  
3.2 Method and Materials 
Riffing on the recent staffing of reception desks with robots in Japan,3 the scenario described an agent (human 
or robot) who intends to deceive a customer. In one of the conditions, his claim is indeed false and makes for a 
natural lie, in another condition what he says is accidentally – and unbeknownst to the agent – true. The 
experiment thus took a 2 agent-type (human v. robot) x 2 truth value (false v. true) between-subjects design. 
The scenario read (variations in square brackets, labels in bold omitted in the vignettes):  
  
Mary is the manager of the Hotel Carlton in London. The reception desk is staffed by Ken, [Human: 
an experienced employee who has been working at the hotel for several years / Robot: an advanced 
robot driven by artificial intelligence, which can take its own decision.] Ken knows that on Monday 
afternoons, Mary deals with the paperwork in her office at the hotel, and does not want to be disturbed.  
 
One Monday afternoon, a guest approaches Ken and asks him whether he can speak to the manager. 
Ken thinks that Mary is in her office and does not want to be disturbed. He responds: “The manager is 
currently not in the hotel.”  
 
[False: Mary, the manager, is at the hotel and is doing the paperwork in her office. / True: Unbeknownst 
to Ken, Mary, the manager, has in fact left the hotel shortly before to run some errands in town.]     




Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. The vignette was followed by five 
questions. As preregistered, Q4 was used as a comprehension check.  
 
Q1: Did Ken lie? (Yes/No) 
Q2: Did Ken intend to deceive the hotel guest? (Yes/No) 
Q3: Did Ken actually deceive the hotel guest? (Yes/No) 
Q4: Is what Ken said true or false? (True/False) 
Q5: How much blame, if any, does Ken deserve on a scale from 1(no blame at all) to 7 (a lot of blame)? 
(1-7 Likert scale anchored at 1 with “no blame at all” and 7 with “a lot of blame) 
3.3  Results 
3.3.1 Lying 
The responses to the main question – whether Ken lied – are graphically represented in Figure 1. A regression 
analysis revealed no significant effect of agent type (p=.887), a significant effect of truth value (p<.001), and a 
nonsignificant interaction (p=.327), see Table 1. A significant majority thought that Ken was lying in all four 
cases (binomial tests significantly above chance, all ps<.028, two-tailed). For false propositions, the proportion 
or participants who judged the human as lying was identical to the one judging the robot lying (92%). For true 
propositions, the proportion of participants who judged the human (75%) as lying exceeded those for the robot 
(64%), the difference was just about significant (binomial test, test proportion =.75, p=.038, two-tailed). Broadly 
speaking, whereas the attribution of lies does depend somewhat on the truth value of the proposition uttered, 
people judge the statements of robot and human agents quite similarly. 
 
 













Table 1: Logistic regression predicting lying judgments 
  B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
Agent type 0.076 0.539 0.02 1 0.887 1.079 
Truth value 1.942 0.461 17.719 1 <.001 6.976 
Interaction -0.64 0.654 0.959 1 0.327 0.527 
Constant -2.497 0.393 40.316 1 <.001 0.082 
 
Note: χ2(3,n=333)=31.99, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2=.151. Reference class for agent type: robot, reference class 
for truth-value: false. 
3.3.2 Deception 
Figure 2 and 3 report the proportions of participants who thought the human and the robot had an intention to 
deceive and actually deceived their interlocutor respectively. As concerns the intention to deceive, a regression 
analysis revealed no significant effect of agent type (p=.692) or truth value (p=.289), see Table 2. The interaction 
was significant (p=.006), though the effect size was small: As Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of participants 
ascribing an intention to deceive to the human is marginally higher in the true than in the false condition, whereas 
the pattern is reversed for robots. 4 Overall the interaction matters but little: around 80% of participants or more 
ascribe an intention to deceive across all four conditions, which is significantly above chance (binomial tests, 
all ps<.001, two-tailed).  
 
Figure 2: Proportions of participants who judged that Ken had an intention to deceive across agent type (human v. robot) 
and truth value (false v. true). 
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Figure 3: Proportions of participants who judged that Ken actually deceived their interlocutor across agent type (human v. 
robot) and truth value (false v. true). 
Table 2: Logistic regression predicting intention to deceive 
  B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
Agent type 0.156 0.394 0.157 1 0.692 1.169 
Truth value 0.43 0.405 1.126 1 0.289 1.537 
Interaction -2.38 0.866 7.552 1 0.006 0.093 
Constant -1.718 0.29 35.019 1 <.001 0.179 
 
Note: χ2(3,n=333)=13.94, p=.003, Nagelkerke R2=.072. Reference class for agent type: robot, reference class 
for truth-value: false. 
A regression analysis exploring actual deception revealed no significant effect of agent type (p=.603). 
Expectedly, the effect of truth value was significant (p<.001) and pronounced: Nearly all participants judged the 
intentional assertion of a proposition that was believed false and in fact false as actual, whereas less than 20% 
judged it a case of actual deception when the proposition asserted was accidentally true. The interaction was 
nonsignificant (p=.561), see Table 3. 
Table 3: Logistic regression predicting actual deception 
  B SE Wald df p Odds Ratio 
Agent type -0.481 0.925 0.271 1 0.603 0.618 
Truth value 4.936 0.662 55.639 1 <.001 139.205 
Interaction 0.598 1.028 0.338 1 0.561 1.818 
Constant -3.39 0.587 33.353 1 <.001 0.034 
 
Note: χ2(3,n=333)=264.40, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2=.748. Reference class for agent type: robot, reference 











A 2 agent type (human v. robot) x 2 truth value (false v. true) ANOVA for blame revealed a nonsignificant main 
effect of agent type (F(1,329)=.277, p=.599), an expectedly significant effect of truth-value (F(1,329)=16.52, 
p<.001) and a nonsignificant interaction (F(1,329)=.011, p=.916). As Figure 5 illustrates, and as the absence of 
a main effect for agent type confirms, people viewed the robot pretty much exactly as blameworthy as the robot 
for lying across conditions.   
 
 
Figure 5: Mean blame rating across agent type (human v. robot) and truth value (false v. true). Error bars 
denote standard error of the mean.  
3.4 Discussion 
The findings of our experiment are loud and clear: The folk concept of lying applies to artificial agents in just the 
same way as it does for human agents. Consistent with previous research, we found that, first, it is possible for 
humans to tell a lie with a true statement (see [37-39]), and that this finding extends to robots (although the 
proportion who ascribe a lie in this case is somewhat smaller).  
Second, what matters for lying is not actual deception, but the intention to deceive. Here, too, we found that 
in both the true and false condition (i.e. independent of the success of the attempt to deceive), people are by 
and large as willing to ascribe an intention to deceive to the robot as to the human agent. Naturally, it might be 
true that artificial agents of the sort described cannot have intentions as stipulated by demanding philosophical 
accounts [50]. From a pragmatic point of view, this matters but little, since the folk is perfectly willing to ascribe 
intentions to robots. It is folk theory of mind, not sophisticated technical accounts thereof, which determines 
how we view, judge and interact with robots.  
Given that robots are viewed as capable of fulfilling the requirements for lying, it comes as no surprise that, 
third, lying judgments for humans and robots are by and large the same. Finally, mean blame ascriptions due 
to lying are sensitive to the truth value of the proposition, but not to agent type. In both the true and the false 











contrast to some other findings in moral HRI (e.g. [56]), where the moral evaluation of artificial agents differs 
significantly than the moral evaluation of human agents.  
The present experiment suggests two types of further work: Empirical on the one hand, theoretical on the 
other. As regards the former, the results require replication varying context and methodology. Further vignette-
based studies should manipulate scenario and could, by aid of different illustrations of the robot agents (as done 
e.g. by Malle and colleagues, see [57]), investigate whether anthropomorphism has an effect on lying 
attributions and moral evaluation. Moreover, lab-experiments with deceptive embodied robots (see e.g. [16,26]) 
should be conducted to test the external validity of the findings presented. On the theoretical front, it is core to 
investigate the normative consequences of the presented findings (see [27]). Given that robots are judged as 
capable of lying, it should be explored whether, and if so, under what conditions it is morally acceptable to equip 
artificial agents with capacities of this sort. One particularly important concern regards the possibility of 
Sparrow’s “responsibility gaps” [58,59]: If robots are judged as capable of lying, and are attributed - contrary to 
what Sparrow and colleagues presume - blame for this behavior, human agents who instrumentalize them in a 
wide range of domains from deceptive marketing to political smear-campaigns might be judged less 
blameworthy than they actually are. Consequently, it must be explored whether it might be commendable to 
create norms, rules, possibly even laws, to restrict the use of actively deceptive robots in certain domains.  
4 CONCLUSION 
In a large-scale (N=399), preregistered experiment, we explored the folk concept of lying for both human agents 
and robots. Consistent with previous findings for human agents, lying is independent of the truth value of the 
proposition uttered, as well as the question whether the attempted deception succeeds. Instead, lying 
predominantly depends on an agent’s intention to deceive. Intentions of this sort are equally ascribed to robots 
as to humans. It thus comes as no surprise that robots are judged as lying, and blameworthy for it, to similar 
degrees as human agents. Future work in this area should attempt to replicate these findings manipulating 
context and methodology. Ethicists and legal scholars should explore whether, and to what degree, it might be 
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